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  When the monetary authority controls the short-term interest rate we find 
that under a regime of permanent (and even persistent but temporary) deficits 
that a strict upper bound on the feasible interest rate sequence is present. More 
generally, the satisfaction of the fiscal authority’s present value budget 
constraint in the presence of a deficit sequence, means that monetary and fiscal 
decisions cannot be independent. This is an important caveat to the results in 
McCallum (1984) 
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The seminal contribution of Sargent and Wallace (1981) convinced most
macroeconomists that the eﬀective conduct of monetary policy will be hampered
by imprudent ﬁscal policy. In characterizing monetary and ﬁscal policy as inﬁnite
sequences of decisions, constrained ultimately by a transversality condition, the
potential tensions were brought into sharp relief. With suﬃciently high interest
rates a permanent sequence of deﬁcits might result in the government being
unable to place its debt in the market. In order to meet the present-value
budget constraint (PVBC), seigniorage revenue may need to rise. The monetary
authority loses de facto control of the price-level, either now or in the future and
there results a repudiation of the escalating debt via inﬂation.
However, McCallum (1984) demonstrated that permanent deﬁcits need not
have inﬂationary consequences when the deﬁcit is deﬁned to include interest
payments. In other words, ﬁscal policy can be separated from monetary
consequences providing the ﬁscal authority responds to the correct state variable in
formulating its sequence of instrument choices. However, both these analyses and
the literature that followed,1 assumed that the monetary authority’s instrument is
the monetary base and that prices are perfectly ﬂexible. Whilst both assumptions
have been useful, their removal oﬀers new insights.
Woodford (1997) shows that modelling the monetary authority as controlling
the short-term nominal interest rate - which in the presence of sticky prices implies
control of the short-term real rate - is consistent with a determinate (locally)
unique rational expectations equilibrium. In this note, therefore, we adopt the
perspective that monetary authorities can inﬂuence the short-term real interest
rate.2
1See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1994) for an introduction.
2Taylor (1999) also argues that monetary policy can be usefully characterised as a feedback
2Section 2 outlines the PVBC analysis for two alternate ﬁscal policy regimes
and their implications for feasible interest rate sequences. Section 3 considers
some extensions of our argument. Section 4 concludes and oﬀers some remarks
on our main result, that a ﬁscal policy that runs permanent deﬁcits always ends
up constraining the feasible sequence of interest rates.
2. The Analysis
Consider a deterministic economy, in which wealth takes one of two forms: money,
which earns no interest, and one-period nominal, riskless bonds, which do earn
interest.3 The one-period public sector ﬂow budget constraint is given by:
Bt
(1 + it)
= Bt−1 + Pt(Gt − Tt) − (Mt − Mt−1), (2.1)
where Bt is the nominal quantity of debt redeemed at the start of t +1 , it is the
nominal interest rate between period t and t +1 , Pt is the aggregate price level,
(Gt − Tt) is the real primary deﬁcit in period t,a n d(Mt − Mt−1) is seigniorage
raised in period t. A central assumption is that the monetary-ﬁscal sequences










rule for the short term nominal interest rate. As well as outlining the ‘Taylor principle’ he
examines the general scope of the ﬁnding through time and across several countries.
3The following analysis does not model the behavior of the private sector, as the main points
can be made without doing so.
4The no-Ponzi game restriction is consistent with optimal private sector behavior. O’Connell
and Zeldes (1988) ﬁnd that no rational individual will hold the liabilities of a government
that attempts to run a Ponzi game. That is because the welfare of any individual holding
such government debt for any period will be strictly lower than under an alternate feasible
consumption program. Had we modelled the representative agent side of the model we could
have generated a slightly diﬀerent form of this restriction where the consumption Euler equation
would have been used to substitute the marginal utility of wealth for the interest rate term. See,
for example, McCallum (1984).
3Whilst we do not model explicitly the behaviour of private agents, it is known
that their optimal consumption-saving programme will also be characterized by
conditions analogous to (2.2).5 We take (2.2) to be suﬃcient to ensure that
the PVBC is satisﬁed, and that given the level of outstanding liabilities at the
start of any time period the ensuing intertemporal sequence of net surpluses plus
seigniorage is suﬃcient to meet those liabilities.
Let Tt denote the period t tax yield. We will analyze ﬁscal rules (regimes) of
the form







Fiscal policy is characterised by the sequence {(λt+s,γt+s)}T
s=0, that is by choices
on size of the deﬁcit, (1 − λ)G, and the rate at which debt is retired, γ.W e
assume that γ is constant and 0 <γ<1, so that the government retires a portion
of outstanding debt. For simplicity, we further assume that seigniorage is rebated
lump sum to agents. The particular rules that we analyze will then be indexed
simply by restrictions on the sequence {λt+s}T
s=0. Before we proceed we need to
clarify the implications of (2.2) for our class of ﬁscal policy rules. First, given
the restrictions on γ,t h eﬁscal authority, looking forward from any time t,w i l l
always do enough to repay the outstanding debt in existence at the start of time
t. Consequently, ﬁscal solvency hinges on the present value of future surpluses
and deﬁcits (in t+1,t+2,...). So, we need to clarify the implications of (2.2) for
t h i ss e q u e n c e .I tt u r n so u tt h a ta st i m eT →∞the fundamental requirement for
5This brief comment hardly does justice to the issues arising from the incorporation and
intepretation of (2.2) in an economic model. For instance, as the recent debate over the
ﬁscal theory of the price-level demonstrates, whether one views (2.2) merely as an equilibrium
condition of an economic model, as opposed to a requirement regardless of the price or interest
sequence, has profound implications for issues such as price determinacy under interest rate
pegs, exchange rate determinacy and the necessity of base money to the central bank’s control
of inﬂation. See Janssen, Nolan and Thomas (2002) for a discussion of some of these issues.
For the purposes of this paper we do not adopt a ﬁscalist stance. In other words, we view (2.2)
as holding for all feasible price and interest rate sequences, and not just equilibrium sequences.













⎦ → 0. (2.4)
In other words, the discounted sum of net government liabilities must tend to
zero.
2.1. Fiscal Regime (1): A Balanced Budget
Suppose that the government is prohibited from running ﬁscal deﬁcits at any
time, and in each period retires a portion of outstanding debt (γBt−1),a n dm e e t s
all current period expenditure, denoted PtGt. Fiscal policy is thus the sequence
{(λ,γ)}T
s=0 with λ =1and 0 <γ<1, ∀s. Monetary policy is the sequence of
one period decisions denoted by {it+s}T
s=0.I np e r i o dt the tax yield is:







Using (2.5) in (2.1) reveals that
Bt
(1 + it)
=( 1− γ)Bt−1. (2.6)
Iterating on this expression demonstrates that such a ﬁscal rule satisﬁes the no













T+1Bt−1 =0 . (2.7)
6To show this, substitute (2.3) into (2.1) and iterate forward, successively substituting for
period debt.
5To conﬁrm this, set λ =1∀s in equation (2.4).7 The balanced budget ﬁscal
rule is clearly a special case as it assumes that the ﬁscal authority will never run a
primary deﬁcit from period t onwards. We go now to another extreme which has
been the focus of much attention.
2.2. Fiscal Regime (2): Permanent Deﬁcits
The existence of a permanent deﬁcit implies 0 <λ<1.W ec o n t i n u et oa s s u m e
t h a tt h e r ei sal o w e rb o u n do nt a x e sd e t e r m i n e db yt h et h ed e b tr e p a y m e n t
parameter γ.T h eﬁs c a lr u l ei sn o w :







Substituting (2.8) into (2.1) yields
Bt
(1 + it)
=( 1− γ)Bt−1 +( 1− λ)PtGt. (2.9)
The public sector is now running a deﬁcit in every period. This policy is























Our conclusions under in Section 2.1 demonstrate that we require the second
term on the right-hand side of this expression to converge to zero. As (2.10) is a
7Note that γ need not be a ‘big’ number. In fact, as is clear from the analysis in Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2001), it could in fact be identically zero for a large, but ﬁnite, number of
time periods whilst still ensuring solvency.
6special case of (2.4) it will be convenient to make some simplifying assumptions.
A useful special case is when the sequence of nominal government expenditures is
ﬁxed:
(1 − λ)Pt+sGt+s =( 1− λ)PG ∀s. (2.11)
We can now see why a sequence of permanent ﬁscal deﬁcits leaves monetary
policy hamstrung. Substituting (2.11) into (2.10) we note that the second















For a given rate of debt retirement (γ), the implication for monetary policy
is clear: it must drive the expression in square braces to zero. Alternatively,
for any given interest rate sequence, γ must be suﬃciently accommodative. An
illuminating example of the implication for monetary policy is where interest rates






∀s ≥ 0. (2.13)














Consequently, as T →∞expression (2.14) tends to zero. Although it is clear that
(2.13) is not unique,8 i nt h es p i r i to fM c C a l l u m( 1 9 8 4 )w eﬁnd that (2.13) is a
8There are a number of ways to see this non-uniqueness. Perhaps the most obvious is to
note that if it+s =
©
(1 − γ)−2 − 1
ª
∀s ≥ 0 is a feasible equilibrium sequence then so too must
be it+s =
©
[2(1 − γ)]−2 − 1
ª
∀s ≥ 0.
7suﬃcient condition for permanent primary deﬁcits to be a feasible ﬁscal policy.
More importantly, we ﬁnd that permanent ﬁscal deﬁc i t s ,s u c ha sR e g i m e( 2 ) ,p l a c e
an upper bound on the sequence of interest rates and so do not imply separability
in the feasible set of monetary and ﬁscal choices. The intuition is simply that
the bound increasingly constrains the interest rate sequence as the rate of debt
retirement falls.
3. Some Extensions
The discussion above holding nominal government expenditure ﬁxed does not
indicate that we need to assume an extreme form of price rigidity. What is critical,
as we now make explicit, is that, for a given value of γ, the monetary authority
needs suﬃcient control over the real interest rate. We continue to assume that















As in the previous example, the expression in square braces must tend to zero to
ensure ﬁscal solvency. Expression (3.1) can usefully be re-written as














As u ﬃcient condition for this expression to reach zero in the limit is simply that
the term in square braces is convergent, as opposed to having a zero limiting
value.9 T h i sw i l lb et h ec a s ea sl o n ga st h ef o l l o w i n gr e q u i r e m e n ti sm e ti n ﬁnitely
9See Rudin (1976), Theorem 3.3(c), page 49.
8often:10
is − πs+1 <γ ∀ s ≥ T. (3.3)
This expression has a very obvious interpretation; it requires that the ﬁscal
authority eventually repay a suﬃcient portion of the debt each period.11 An
alternative interpretation, is that the debt retirement schedule places an upper
bound on the feasible real interest rate sequence.
F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a te v e nw h e nd e ﬁcits are merely persistent, the above
arguments go through. That is consider a deﬁcit Dt = ρDt−1,w h e r eρ>1
and Dt ≡ (1 − λ)PtGt. A restriction analogous to (3.3) occurs:
(1 − ρ)+is − πs+1 <γ ∀ s ≥ T. (3.4)
Expression (3.4) shows the constraint on monetary policy is clearly eased, but
is still not entirely absent either.
4. Conclusions
Our results complement those of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and especially
McCallum (1984). The latter showed that incorporating the interest burden into
the arithmetic of ﬁscal solvency is important for the independence of monetary
policy. However, if instead we view monetary policy as control of the short term
real interest rate, the constraint imposed on monetary policy by a permanent
deﬁcit takes the form of an upper bound on the interest rate sequence. And
even under less extreme ﬁscal policies, such as a temporary but persistent deﬁcit,
monetary conduct may be hampered. This latter result may also shed some light
10We are essentially drawing on d’Alembert’s ratio test. This says that for a convergent
series: lim sup
n→∞
|an+1/an| < 1. In the text, however, we are eﬀectively unwinding the unstable
roots forward to ensure convergence.
11Actually this expression is an approximation, since we ignore the cross term:
[(pt+1/pt) − 1] × γ.
9on why some monetary policy makers, such as at the European Central Bank,
may support strict controls on the ﬁscal policies of member states.
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